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Abstract  
Support for social distancing measures was, globally, high at the early stages of the 
COVID-19 pandemic but increasingly came under pressure. Focusing on the UK, this 
article provides a rigorous exploration of the drivers of public support for social distancing 
at their formative stage, via mixed-methods. Synthesising insights from crisis 
management and securitisation theory, thematic analysis is employed to map the main 
frames promoted by the government and other actors on the nature/severity, 
blame/responsibility and appropriate response to the pandemic, which ‘follows the 
science’. The impact of these on public attitudes is examined via a series of regression 
analyses, drawing on a representative survey of the UK population (n = 2,100). Findings 
challenge the prevailing understanding that support for measures is driven by personal 
health considerations, socio-economic circumstances and political influences. Instead, 
framing dynamics, which the government is well-positioned to dominate, have the greatest 










Following the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) declaration of a global health 
emergency on January 30th 2020, upgraded to a ‘pandemic’ on 11th March (WHO, 2020), 
governments across the world implemented social distancing measures to delay the 
spread of the virus. Such measures are considered the cornerstone of public health 
interventions for addressing widespread disease transmission (Kass, 2001), and for 
containing COVID-19 in particular (Matrajt and Leung, 2020). While most governments 
experienced a high degree of public support at the start of the crisis, continued acceptance 
of lockdown measures increasingly came under pressure in many countries (Boin et al., 
2020). Epidemiologists would attribute this to the ‘prevention paradox’, whereby measures 
that have a major impact on public health are difficult to implement, if individuals perceive 
a low probability of being affected by the disease (Rose, 1985). This paradox has urgent 
practical and political dimensions, since measures that limit civil liberties, democratic 
rights and economic activities may face strong public opposition over time, potentially 
fuelled by conspiracy theories and populist mobilisations. This article provides a rigorous 
analysis of the drivers of public support for social distancing, a question of urgent 
comparative importance, drawing on empirical data collected at the start of the crisis, 
which provide a relatively clean ‘laboratory setting’ to study political behaviour and 
attitudes, at their formative stage. 
 
Research indicates that support for social distancing is influenced by multiple factors, but 
studies have yet to consider the interplay between them to determine their relative 
explanatory power. Early empirical studies focussed on health-related variables and 
demographic characteristics to account for behavioural differences between social 
groups, noting decreased compliance among people with low educational attainment and 
health literacy (Wolf et al., 2020), among members of racial/ethnic minorities (Van Scoy 
et al., 2020), and among men and those experiencing health or economic vulnerability 
(Lancet, 2020). Social psychologists have focused on the influence of personal norms, 
values and social identities in driving behaviour (Jetten et al. 2020; Wolf et al 2020), which 
are more susceptible to targeted interventions within a particular societal context 
compared to demographic factors, as research on climate change has shown (e.g. 
Hornsey et al., 2016). The role of context to account for individual attitudes and behaviours 
is also highlighted, implicitly, by Lennon et al (2020) who found ‘marked regional 
differences in intent to follow key public health recommendations’. Socio-political factors 
explain regional variation, with higher levels of compliance, for example, reported in the 
USA among residents in Democratic counties, compared to Republican ones (Painter and 
Qiu, 2020). More broadly, trust in institutions, ideology and partisanship have consistently 
been found to influence public attitudes during the pandemic (Allcott et al., 2020; Barrios 
and Hochberg, 2020).  
 
One specific area that has, so far, received surprisingly little attention concerns the effect 
of political cues on public attitudes, which in previous crises was shown to drive support 
for exceptional and unprecedented measures, controlling for socio-economic and political 
factors (e.g. Karyotis and Rüdig, 2015). After all, persuasion, short of pure coercion, ‘is 
the most direct way to mobilise or paralyse a group’ (Cruz, 2000, 275) and is considered 
‘the main currency of crisis management’ (‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009, 23). The ability of 
political elites to use language to set the parameters for audiences to interpret, categorise 
and evaluate complex or unexpected developments, such as the pandemic, is amplified 
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at times of crises (Benford and Snow, 2000). Crises generate fast and contradictory 
information, which forms competing frames concerning a crisis’ nature and severity, the 
responsibility for its occurrence or escalation, and the appropriate response and sacrifices 
it requires to curtail its development. Framing around these exact dimensions takes central 
stage (Entman, 1993; Boin et al., 2009).  Simonov et al. (2020) demonstrated that 
exposure to Fox News coverage, for example, predicts opposition to social distancing, 
which is suggestive of an effect of differential messaging by politicians. Mintrom and 
O’Connor (2020) also analysed the variations in the narratives promoted by four US state 
governors, convincingly arguing that these influenced the local policy development and 
implementation of social distancing measures, without, however, exploring how the public, 
as the audience of these narratives, perceived them. These, fruitfully, suggest that more 
systematic efforts are required to analytically dovetail the attitudes of citizens with the 
messages of their leaders during the pandemic.  
 
The article seeks to address this gap, by synthesising insights from crisis management, 
political behaviour and securitisation literatures, and utilising Britain, as an ‘extreme case-
study’. Extreme case-studies correspond to a case that is considered to be paradigmatic 
of a broader process or development. The focus on a case that lies far away from the 
mean of a given distribution facilitates exploratory analysis that may disconfirm or confirm 
a prevalent understanding (see Seawright and Gerring, 2008). The lacklustre response of 
the United Kingdom (UK) government at the early stages of the pandemic, when nearly 
all countries in the world had taken decisive measures to contain the spread of the virus, 
provides an ideal research setting. This allows us to empirically test the dominant 
understanding in the emerging literature on COVID-19 that support for social distancing 
is largely dependent on personal circumstances, health and economic vulnerabilities, and 
political factors (such as ideology and trust). Through a series of regression analyses, we 
explore the explanatory power of corresponding models, while also contrasting them to 
models that are explicitly drawn from the crisis management literature and, specifically, 
the key framing contests in the UK about the nature, severity, responsibility and 
appropriate response to the pandemic. 
 
To analyse the drivers of support for social distancing, the article employs mixed methods. 
First, thematic analysis of public discourse is employed to map how the main frames that 
crisis management theory draws attention to were represented in public debates during 
the first month of the UK lockdown, and by whom. Second, to assess the extent to which 
these key frames had an impact on public attitudes, we analyse original and pertinent 
survey evidence of a representative sample of the UK population (n=2,100), administered 
online between 10 and 15 April 2020.  This was shortly after the initial implementation of 
social distancing measures but prior to the subsequent politicisation around the 
government’s crisis management performance. We begin the analysis by engaging with 
theoretical debates about the role of framing in crisis management and securitisation 
literatures, and their implications for pandemic politics, before introducing our data and 
methods. Next, framing contests in the UK on the nature, severity, blame attribution and 
appropriate response, which ‘follows the science’ are matched with public attitudes along 
the same dimensions, showing a remarkable degree of alignment, in most cases. Our 
analysis of unique and pertinent survey data in the final section demonstrates that the 
variables inspired by the crisis management and securitisation literatures produce, by far, 
the strongest model to explain support, or opposition, for social distancing in the UK in 
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comparison to models that rely on health, economic, and political variables. This 
challenges the prevailing understanding on what drives public attitudes and has significant 
theoretical and empirical implications, which are discussed in the conclusion. 
Crisis Management, Securitisation Theory and Pandemic Politics  
The role of elite framing and language as drivers of public attitudes is emphasised by both 
crisis management and securitisation literatures, among others. Crises can be understood 
as the combined products of sudden events and social perceptions, largely defined by the 
dominant narratives surrounding them (Rosenthal et al., 1989). In highly polarised 
contexts, this produces greater competition between political actors, attempting to either 
‘contain or exploit crisis-induced opportunity space for political posturing and policy 
change’ (‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009, 23). From a social constructivist understanding of 
security (Buzan et al., 1998), elites – usually political leaders – employ the rhetoric of 
‘existential threat’ in order to mobilise support for the implementation of ‘extraordinary’ 
measures, with the consent of a specific audience – usually the general public (Williams, 
1998, 435). Henceforth, convincing an empowering audience that a ‘referent object’ they 
value is facing an existential threat provides authorities with a green light to legitimise 
exceptional emergency measures, beyond ‘normal politics’, a process known as 
‘securitisation’ (Buzan et al, 1998). 
 
From both perspectives, political elites are assumed to be the protagonists of crisis 
management and, by virtue of their position and/or expertise, the dominant actors in 
producing ‘legitimate’ security discourses. Governments have no choice, in times of crisis, 
but to ‘attempt to reduce public and political uncertainty and inspire confidence in crisis 
leaders by formulating and imposing a convincing narrative’ (Boin et al., 2016, 79). Elites 
manipulate, strategise and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative 
(Brändström and Kuipers, 2003). Therefore, frames are typically in direct competition with 
one another, while also constrained by ‘pre-existing meaning structures or schemas’ that 
apply to a particular context (Scheufele, 1999, 105). Successful framing ‘occurs when in 
the course of describing a campaign, issue, problem, or event, a speaker’s emphasis on 
a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on those 
considerations when constructing their opinions’ (Druckman, 2001, 1042). Making some 
aspects of a crisis more salient in discourse promotes a particular causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and treatment/recommendation (Entman, 1993, 52). The implication is 
that when it comes to the politics of crisis and security, perceptions matter more than the 
objective reality, with political elites assumed to be the main actors that shape public 
attitudes and behaviours, from the top down. 
 
However, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, there are two main reasons why this 
may not necessarily apply. First, prior research has shown that with regards to health 
issues, domestic and international health experts play an equally, if not more important, 
role than domestic political elites in facilitating support for extraordinary public health 
interventions (Davies, 2008; Curley and Herington, 2011; Bengtsson and Rhinard, 2019). 
Second, in the face of a global threat, the public may come to appreciate its severity 
through a multitude of sources and, accordingly, pressure their governments to act. 
Infectious disease outbreaks are characteristic of a global challenge that impacts upon 
populations, irrespective of the political borders that surround them, with the timing of 
5 
 
response being of the essence (Curley and Herington, 2011). In protracted crises, similarly 
to protracted conflicts, securitisation processes are not expected to follow a top-down path 
but may also follow a horizontal and even bottom-up trajectory, particularly as the salience 
of the threat rises and counter-measures are adopted internationally (Adamides, 2020). 
Indeed, evidence from the UK suggests that some people supported and practiced social-
distancing even before the imposition of the national lockdown (Christakis, 2020), with, for 
example, walk-ins and reservations in seated-diners plummeting two days after the WHO 
declared COVID-19 a pandemic.  
 
Overall, and drawing on the extant literature, it is possible to identify, deductively, four 
main battlegrounds in crisis-induced framing contests. Two are ‘diagnostic’ (concerned 
with how a problem is represented) and two are ‘prognostic’ (concerned with the 
articulation of concrete solutions to the problem) (Benford and Snow, 2000). The first 
contest is about the severity and nature of the crisis. Global health issues are by no means 
new, however, their salience only increased after the end of the Cold War. Since the 
1990s, states, particularly in the West, and international organisations like the WHO, 
increased their efforts to define infectious diseases as an urgent security threat that 
necessitates the design of new rules and behaviours for their successful containment 
(Davies, 2008). Health experts, economists, defence strategists, academics, 
entrepreneurs and politicians sounded the alarm about the dire potential consequences, 
if governments failed to prepare adequately for an outbreak. For example, the WHO 
(2005) referred to the inescapability of a deadly pandemic influenza that could kill 
anywhere between 2 and 12 million people globally. Other actors and agents used war-
like metaphors to stress the severity and multifaceted nature of natural or manufactured 
deadly pathogens (Sanders and Chopra, 2003). However, typically, domestic contextual 
factors and short-term electoral calculations determine whether political elites downplay 
or emphasise how serious a threat is and how it should be principally understood (Boin et 
al., 2009).  
 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, some governments, notably the British, delayed framing 
the virus as an existential threat and introducing emergency measures, which may have 
contributed to the UK having one of the highest death counts in Europe. According to 
securitisation theory, however, the objective severity of a threat measured, for example, 
in terms of casualties, is not important; what matters is perceived severity (Buzan et al., 
1998). While frames have ‘to be based on an accepted empirically valid reality’, a multi-
faceted crisis provides opportunities for elite actors to draw attention to a sub-set of 
considerations and set the parameters within which the severity and nature of a threat is 
interpreted by the audience. Evidence from Italy by Briscese et al (2020) indicates that the 
management of public expectations, through effective communication mechanisms, is a 
predictor of support for social distancing measures, more so than objective markers, such 
as the duration of lockdowns. Similarly, in the UK case, we may expect that the actual 
number of deaths, as a proxy of objective severity, does not influence public attitudes. 
Instead, public perceptions about the presence of a serious threat to a ‘referent object’, 
whose survival is framed to be at stake, is what securitisation theory predicts would drive 
support for emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998). During a global health crisis, 
human lives are the obvious referent object. However, concern about other objects that 
are valued in a particular context, such as social identities, economic and political values, 
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or important structures and national institutions, would likely also influence attitudes to 
social distancing through successful framing. 
 
The second contest involves blame attribution dynamics – efforts to avoid culpability and 
manoeuvrings to allocate responsibility (Hood, 2002; Kuipers and Brändström, 2020). This 
contest may not only make or break the viability of implemented policies, but also the 
political fortunes of incumbent leaders (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, 28). While government 
elites have an electoral self-interest in avoiding being held accountable for negative 
developments, it is intuitive that this would also likely undermine public support for crisis 
measures. To prevent this, it is common for governments to adopt an exogenous frame, 
a form of othering, whereby the reasons for the emergence of a crisis, or its escalation, 
are portrayed as beyond their control in order to deflect blame and attention away from 
any policy mishaps (‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009, 28-29). This can be done through defensive 
narratives, like disqualifying critics, accusing the accusers, or diverting the blame to others 
(Bovens, 1999). However, it may also be achieved through positive messaging, designed 
to override the ‘prevention paradox’ (Rose, 1985) and ‘collective action problem’ (Olson, 
1965), which de-incentivise those with perceived declining probabilities of contracting 
COVID-19 from supporting social distancing.  Social psychologists have shown that 
promoting 'altruistic' and 'pro-environmental' values impacts on attitudes and behaviours, 
‘for example by framing pro-environmental action as a form of patriotism or as an 
investment in ‘green’ technologies’ (Hornsey et al., 2016, 625). Similarly, in the case of 
the pandemic, we would expect that people would be more likely to support measures, if 
they were instilled with positive incentives to contribute to a ‘public good’. This is, perhaps, 
of even greater importance in the face of a novel and immediate threat to life, compared 
to the long-standing but perhaps more intangible risks associated with climate change, 
which facilitate the activation of pre-existing norms to influence public behaviour. 
  
The third contest is about remedies and trade-offs – competing frames about how to 
respond to a crisis, and at what cost. The comparative and theoretical literature provides 
us with a non-exhaustive blueprint of prognostic frames that typically compete during a 
crisis, whose relevance as predictors of attitudes during the pandemic we examine in the 
UK context. The most potent framing strategy to mobilise public support, according to 
securitisation theory, is to convince an audience that ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) to 
the introduction of extraordinary but necessary measures, before it is too late (Buzan et 
al., 1998). Empirical evidence from the Great Recession demonstrates both the salience 
(e.g. Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell, 2009) and the impact of TINA on political behaviour 
(e.g. Karyotis and Rüdig, 2015). Furthermore, a ‘crisis as opportunity’ frame would likely 
help energise public support on the promise that we will ultimately be emerging stronger 
from the crisis. On the other hand, fatalistic frames, such as that ‘nothing can be done’ to 
stop the spread of COVID-19, would likely reduce compliance and support for social 
distancing, which may also be the indirect effect of frames that undermine confidence on 
the fairness of measures introduced by the government. Crucially, the multifaceted nature 
of the crisis also allows for ‘counter-securitisation’ frames to develop around perceived 
trade-offs, whereby the response to the pandemic is presented as a greater threat to other 
referent objects, such as liberties or economic growth, than the virus itself (Paterson and 





Cutting across these framing contests is a fourth contest about the role of science and 
scientific experts. This is a rather novel and emerging dimension in crisis management 
but not a surprising one, since, as noted, health experts are often more influential than 
politicians in shaping understandings. In a fast-moving and confusing context, it is 
essential that governments draw on the latest scientific evidence to inform debates about 
the origin, nature and severity of a threat, but also, crucially, to determine appropriate 
diagnostics and treatments (Berling, 2011). Governments across the world have 
repeatedly and emphatically claimed to be ‘following the science’ to legitimise the 
measures designed to reduce the spread of COVID-19, which was celebrated as ‘a 
welcome return of scientific expertise to the heart of government’, since governments 
need scientific evidence ‘right here, right now’, to guide their responses, in real time 
(Bronk, 2021). Nevertheless, the literature calls for some caution to be exercised about 
this type of framing. For one, research on advice-taking suggests that ‘decision-makers 
tend to overweight their opinions relative to those of an advisor leading to inferior 
outcomes, even when the advisor is recognized as a highly-trained expert’ (Simonov et 
al., 2020). Evidence from the UK and the USA indicate that decision-makers may 
suppress scientific perspectives that are not congruent with their promoted crisis narrative 
or contradict other political objectives and values (Abbasi, 2020). Furthermore, rather than 
‘de facto’ and absolute truths, scientific results should be treated as provisional and open 
to audit by other scientists, as well as appropriate revisions, when new evidence becomes 
available (Bronk, 2021). These open up the possibility for the politicisation of science in 
ways that allow governments to push political agendas and value choices, while shielding 
themselves from responsibility for outcomes.  
 
Anti-science attitudes have also been shown to increase climate change scepticism 
(Hornsey, 2016) and have more recently been linked with a revolt against the 
‘overeducated’ (Szabados, 2019), perhaps reflecting deeper divides in society, that may 
also influence political behaviour during the pandemic. Indeed, Swami and Barron (2020) 
found that analytical thinking and rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories are strongly 
associated with compliance with social distancing. In our case, we would similarly expect 
that those that reject conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19 to be more likely 
to support social distancing. The question, however, that is most directly susceptible to 
framing effects is whether people trust the scientific experts that advise their government. 
Our expectation is that those who do would be more likely to support social distancing, 
irrespective of their general attitudes towards science. 
 
Overall, our empirical analysis allows us to explore how these four framing contests played 
out in debates in the UK at the start of the crisis, and the extent to which the public’s 
positioning along these key dimensions drives support, or opposition, for social distancing, 
which is our principal aim. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
8 
 
Crisis management research in political and policy studies has generally focused on the 
role of political leaders and institutional responses to threats and crises, at multiple levels 
of governance (Boin et al., 2009; Brändström and Kuipers, 2003). An explanation of this 
is that crisis research in politics emerges from the public administration (public 
management) and organisational (management) disciplines. Indeed, the word 
‘management’ itself brings with it connotations of resource mobilisation, based on 
command and control orientation to governance. With this in mind, crisis studies have had 
a degree of qualitative bias because the implications of the decisions of managers and 
leaders (and their deficiencies) has meant that studies, and their accompanying methods, 
adopt more of a relational perspective. For example, qualitative case study designs, using 
interviews and focus groups, are commonly employed to study the nature of collaborations 
between actors within different phases of the crisis management process (Brändström 
and Kuipers, 2003; Boin et al., 2009). At the same time, political scientists have tended to 
focus, perhaps disproportionately so, on examining routine problems, which has led to a 
degree of fragmentation in crisis management scholarship (Lipscy, 2020).1 The outcome 
of this is that the ‘structures’ or institutions of crisis governance often outweigh the 
attention given to the roles and perspectives of the ‘agents’ (or the public) within crisis 
research.  
 
As a result, there is a distinct lack of crisis management studies which employ quantitative 
methods to empirically measure the extent to which frames correspond to, or indeed, 
influence public understandings and attitudes during a crisis. The same methodological 
imbalance is present in securitisation theory. Buzan et al. (1998, 176-7) prescribe 
discourse analysis as the ‘obvious method’ to study security, without the need for 
‘sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques’. Instead, they argue, ‘the technique is 
simple: Read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined here 
as Security’. Accordingly, ‘most securitisation research focusses on elite constructions of 
the security frame alone, without consideration of the public’s evaluations of this message’ 
(Paterson and Karyotis, 2020, 17). This article helps to address the poorly cultivated 
quantitative field of crisis management and securitisation research through mixed-
methods. 
 
First, we use thematic analysis to map, in the UK context, the four key framing contests 
identified in the literature review. Thematic analysis is a method for searching, identifying 
and analysing theoretically-informed patterns of meaning or themes in a dataset (Daly et 
al., 1997). Our dataset comprised of news articles and official elite communication (e.g. 
state, government and opposition official communications), as well as scientific experts’ 
and advisers’ public announcements and press releases published between 15 February 
2020 (two weeks before the first recorded cases of local transmission in the UK) and 15 
April 2020 (the end date of our survey). This constitutes the timeframe for our study.  
 
Data was collected and analysed manually by two independent coders. We followed a 
hybrid approach to thematic analysis, drawing upon both the data-driven (i.e. inductive) 
(see Boyatzis, 1998) and theoretically-informed (i.e. deductive) approaches (see Crabtree 
and Miller, 1999). This was an iterative and reflexive process with the data collection and 
                                                 
1 Another reason why the crisis management literature has generally privileged qualitative 
methodologies is that the field is dispersed across three largely fragmented bodies of literature: framing 
theory, security studies, and crisis studies (Eriksson, 2020). 
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analysis being conducted concurrently. Data collection and analysis was based on four 
both deductively and inductively generated broad thematic categories: severity (death 
projections/estimates) and nature (health, economic, social, political repercussions of the 
pandemic); blame/responsibility (actors and phenomena associated with the spread of the 
virus); political value choices (TINA; opportunity; fatalism; fairness); policy trade-offs 
(public health vs. civil liberties and the economy); and references to the role of 
science/scientists in pandemic policy-making. Regular coding clinics were held among the 
two researchers to ensure the reliability of data collection and analysis. 
  
Second, we quantitatively analysed pertinent survey evidence to determine what drives 
support for social distancing in the UK. Our data comes from an original survey conducted 
online by the polling organisation Deltapoll. The sample consisted of N=2,100 British 
adults and is representative in terms of age, gender and region. With respect to gender, 
47% of respondents are male (N=984) and 53% female (N= 1,116). 10% of the sample 
self-identified as being Black, Asian, or from an ethnic minority (BAME) (N=224). The 
survey took place between April 10 and 15, 2020, while the UK was entering the third 
week of the first lockdown. The Prime Minister (PM) Boris Johnson was himself 
hospitalised after contracting COVID-19, which may have amplified the ‘rally around the 
flag’ effect by altering the emotional context. Indeed, public attitudes are particularly 
volatile to contextual changes, which typically accelerate during crises.  
 
Since we are interested in attitudes, rather than behaviours, our dependent variable 
focuses on support for ‘allowing people to leave their homes only for essential reasons 
(work, shopping, medical appointments)’, which represents the essence of social 
distancing and was the central theme of the first UK lockdown. Answers to this variable 
take values between 1 (strongly oppose) and 5 (strongly support).  Descriptively, 84% of 
respondents supported (36%) or strongly supported (48%) the lockdown, 10% neither 
supported or opposed, 4% opposed and 2% strongly opposed it. As in other countries 
(Boin, Lodge and Luesink, 2020), there was very high support for social distancing at the 
start of the crisis, indicating that the public had been convinced that COVID-19 
represented an existential threat that justified the suspension of normal life.  
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The timing of our survey allows us to provide a comprehensive account of the drivers of 
support for measures at the start of the crisis by testing the explanatory value of health, 
socio-economic and political models, that have dominated current debates, compared to 
models centred around the four framing contests deriving from the crisis and securitisation 
literatures. Figure 1 shows that, when thinking about their personal circumstances, health-
related worries are the greatest cause of concern, with variant but significant levels of 
concern also in relation to economic and social parameters. Our rich and tailor-made 
questionnaire, which also included measurements of the emerging key frames identified 
in the thematic analysis, allows us to assess the extent to which such considerations 
impact on public attitudes.  
Framing Contests and Corresponding Public Attitudes 
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This section employs thematic analysis to map public discourse around each of the four 
main framing contests identified in the theoretical literature, and the corresponding 
attitudes of the British public. The discussion here also serves to operationalise the 
variables and derive models that we use in the subsequent regression analyses, which 
seeks to identify the drivers of support for social distancing.  
Severity and Nature  
On the day the lockdown was announced, PM Johnson claimed that COVID-19 posed the 
“biggest threat this country has faced for decades” (UK Government, 2020a). While the 
projected number of deaths did not feature in the government’s discourse in this early 
stage of the pandemic, such estimates varied greatly amongst the scientific community. 
Experts placed the number of projected deaths between 500,000 (Kitching, 2020) – the 
worst-case scenario of the ‘herd immunity’ strategy – and 20,000 (Merrick, 2020a) – the 
best-case scenario. Since the very beginning, predominantly public health characteristics 
were ascribed to the threat. These were emphasised by Johnson referencing the rapidly 
growing number of “victims and fatalities”, the continued “sacrifice of key workers”, and 
also the need to defend the “functionality” of the NHS (UK Government, 2020b), which 
were the central elements of the government’s communications (“stay at home, protect 
the NHS, save lives”). Experts, such as the UK Chief Medical Officer, openly warned that 
under a worst-case scenario the NHS could run out of beds for COVID-19 victims (House 
of Commons, 2020).  
 
However, different economic, social, and political aspects, which painted a complex threat, 
also featured in public discourse. The PM acknowledged that there was a serious, multi-
faceted threat posed to the NHS, the economy and British lives (UK Government, 2020a), 
while a week earlier he had emphasised the need to defend the national economy (UK 
Government., 2020b). Experts warned that COVID-19 looked set to hike UK 
unemployment rates (Andrews, 2020), while the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), 
warned that the country faced a ‘large (but hopefully temporary) shock to the economy’ 
(Williams-Grut, 2020). The threat of social unrest made its appearance for the first time in 
public discourse in mid-March, when supermarkets’ supply chains were put under 
pressure from stockpiling customers (Evans and Yorke, 2020). Lastly, the threat of Britain 
becoming a ‘Police State’ can be traced back to the days following the introduction of the 
‘Coronavirus Bill’ on 25th March, which imposed unprecedented restrictions on civil 
liberties in peacetime (Jacobs, 2020).  
 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Descriptive survey results (Figure 2) show that, in general, the British public was in line 
with the more conservative estimates of the expected casualties, with 71% estimating that 
between 10,000 and 50,000 people would eventually die in the UK. At the time, 60,733 
had tested positive for coronavirus and, of those hospitalised, 7,097 had died.2 Perhaps 
surprisingly, more people were worried about economic implications (71%), rather than 
the breakdown of the NHS (56%) which featured heavily in the government’s discourse 
as the second referent object, after ‘saving lives’. People worried far less about social 
unrest (45%) or Britain becoming a police state (32%), which were not promoted by 
                                                 




mainstream political actors. In our analysis, the first model draws on these variables, 
relevant to the perceived nature and severity of the threat. 
 
Blame Attribution 
The government also sought to diffuse responsibility and deflect blame for the crisis by 
continually referencing the global and shared threat that COVID-19 posed. For example, 
Johnson commenced his lockdown speech by stating: “this country is not alone. All over 
the world we are seeing the devastating impact of this invisible killer” (UK Government, 
2020a). As soon as Britain’s death toll from the pandemic reached four figures in late 
March 2020, some government ministers, such as Michael Gove, started ‘outsourcing’ the 
blame for the UK’s lack of mass testing on China. However, this frame was not very 
salient, and certainly far less so in comparison to the US (see Proctor, 2020). 
 
The UK government, instead, directed attention towards personal responsibility, as the 
central positive incentive for the public to embrace the measures and one that can be 
traced to the country’s historical legacy. One week before the introduction of the lockdown, 
the PM appealed to the public to unite like it had done in the past: “The country will get 
through this epidemic [sic], just as it has got through many tougher experiences before if 
we look out for each other and commit wholeheartedly to a full national effort… we are all 
enlisted” (UK Government, 2020b). These types of historical analogies – likening the 
situation to the rallying cries of WW2 – were utilised regularly by the government. Personal 
responsibility was the dominant frame in the PM’s speech announcing the lockdown, 
noting that: “in this fight we can be in no doubt that each and every one of us is … obliged 
to join together and stay at home” (UK Government, 2020b).  
 
[insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 3 shows that an overwhelming majority of the British public embraced the 
government’s message to ‘stay at home and save lives’, identifying ‘those that do not 
follow the social distancing measures’ (75%) as responsible for the outbreak. The 
complementary message that ‘we are all in this together’ also resonated with people, with 
61% blaming ‘each and every one of us’ for the pandemic.  65% of respondents blamed 
the Chinese government and 54% blamed globalisation, while only 35% blamed the UK 
government. This second framing contest is operationalised in our regression through a 
model that includes the top five factors that participants identified as responsible for the 
spread of COVID-19 in the UK. 
 
Remedies and Trade-Offs 
The initial UK government response was to delay implementing social distancing 
measures. Reflecting a fatalistic frame, Johnson suggested on the ‘This Morning’ 
television show on 5th March that ”one of the theories is perhaps you could take it on the 
chin, take it all in one go, and allow the disease, as it were, to move through the population, 
without taking as many draconian measures. I think we need to strike a balance” 
(Simanowitz, 2020). Although Johnson never clearly advocated the ‘take it on the chin’ 
theory in public, this seems to have informed the government’s ‘herd immunity’ response 
up until the announcement of school closures on 20th March. Following public and 
international pressure, the UK government shifted from its delay phase to a contain phase, 
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by introducing a number of mandated social-distancing requirements on 25th March 
(Cabinet Office, 2020).  
 
Johnson encouraged the acceptance of these ‘necessary’ measures in order to reduce 
the number of “victims and fatalities, and protect the NHS” (UK Government, 2020a). The 
emphasis on saving lives and protecting a valued institution implied that there was no 
alternative. The TINA frame was not challenged by any salient mainstream actor in the 
UK, with political leaders rallying around the flag in the face of a perceived existential 
threat. Opposing the measures would likely turn any challenger into a villain, as President 
Ford’s political opponents found out during the 1976 US Swine Flu crisis (Boin et al., 
2016). Instead, the ‘crisis as opportunity’ frame attempted to point to an alternative, 
potentially positive, side of the emerging harsh reality, by envisioning the possibility of a 
better tomorrow following these dark times. For example, in a widely read and circulated 
article in the Financial Times in early April, novelist Arundhati Roy (2020) described 
COVID-19 as a portal, stating that ‘[h]istorically, pandemics have forced humans to break 
with the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no different’.  
 
Indeed, the main frame that challenged TINA focused on criticising the UK government 
for not doing more, sooner, and in a fairer way at the start of the crisis. Partly in response, 
on March 20th the government announced a comprehensive job retention furlough 
scheme, followed by a package for the self-employed workers on 26th March. Jeremy 
Corbyn (then leader of the Opposition) argued that the plans announced did not offer 
equal ‘economic security’ to everyone, with concerns for those in need of ‘sick pay, self-
employed, those reliant on social security, renters, and others’ (UK Labour Party, 2020). 
Corbyn also criticised the introduction of limited measures tailored to the NHS, such as 
the lack of ‘PPE, testing and protection for social care workers’, which threatened the 
health of ‘key workers’ (UK Parliament, 2020).  
 
 
[insert Figure 4 here] 
 
 
Operationalising this framing contest in our questionnaire required careful consideration. 
First, we asked participants a battery of questions that corresponded to the four salient 
prognostic frames identified deductively in the theoretical literature and inductively in our 
thematic analysis. Results are presented in Figure 4. The British public overwhelmingly 
accepted the government’s TINA narrative (83%), but strongly rejected the fatalistic frame 
(58%), which seemed to have guided its initial response. At the same time, half of our 
respondents (49%) embraced the message that the economic burden of the introduced 
measures was unevenly distributed, which was mainly advocated by the Leader of the 
Opposition. Nearly one in two (46%) also embraced the ‘crisis as opportunity’ frame, 








Second, we included two survey instruments to accurately capture public positioning on 
the perceived policy trade-offs between public health and the economy or civil liberties. 
Figure 5 shows that the public was strongly in favour of prioritising public health over 
anything else, in line with the dominant political frames. More specifically, on a scale 
between these four positions, 59% and 70% of our respondents leaned towards 
minimising the number of deaths, whereas only 22% and 13% believed the economy and 
civil liberties, respectively, should take priority. The two variables complete the model on 
remedies and trade-offs. 
 
Science and Scientific Expertise 
This last framing contest, which cuts across the previous three, is about who has the 
necessary expertise and authority to inform how we understand and respond to a 
pandemic, as well as who takes the blame if/when things go wrong. In mid-March 2020, 
the WHO’s director-general stated that every possible action needs to be taken: ‘Not 
testing alone. Not contact tracing alone. Not quarantine alone. Not social distancing alone. 
Do it all’ (Boseley, 2020).. About 400 UK-based scientists and medical experts signed an 
open letter in mid-March urging the government to implement more social distancing 
measures ‘with immediate effect’.3 Expert advice is based on the assumption that 
governments are willing and capable of instigating policy change, although this advice is 
not always followed (Simonov et al., 2020). The government’s testing strategy, and more 
specifically, the ‘pivotal’ decision on March 12th to halt community testing and retreat to 
testing mainly within hospitals, attracted heavy criticism, with Public Health England and 
the Department for Health and Social Care blaming each other (Merrick, 2020b). Perhaps 
to deflect blame, both the PM and the Foreign Secretary stressed that the government 
was following the guidelines of ‘world-leading scientists’ since the very beginning (UK 
Government 2020a; 2020c). Beyond this, science also provides answers as to what 
caused the pandemic. This did not attract attention in public debates in the UK but featured 
in conspiracy theories and in the discourse of other leaders, with US President Trump, for 
example, claiming to have seen undisclosed evidence that COVID-19 escaped from a 
laboratory in Wuhan, China.4 
 
[insert Figure 6 here] 
 
Our fourth crisis model captures these dimensions. We asked participants to indicate their 
trust in scientists advising the government on a 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) 
scale. The median values for trust is 7, indicating a relatively high trust in them. 
Respondents were also asked to indicate, from what they heard or read, what they thought 
were the causes of the pandemic. Figure 6 shows that a majority (64%) agreed with 
scientific explanations, but 24% endorsed conspiracy theories. Our model is completed 
with three variables measuring broader attitudes to science, which people may use as 
‘cognitive heuristics’, or ‘rules of thumb’ in the face of very high complexity (Hornsey et 
al., 2016, 623). Descriptively, 27% of respondents considered that science does more 
                                                 
3 See ‘Public request to take stronger measures of social distancing across the UK with immediate 






harm than good, while 25% considered that we believe too often in science, and not 
enough in feelings.5 Attitudes to climate change are also indicative of and influenced by 
scientific views, with 51% believing it is completely true that climate change will, if 
unchecked, do great damage to the earth’s environment and only 5% finding this 
completely untrue. 
 
Our empirical analysis allows us to compare the explanatory power of our four crisis 
models, to others that relate to health, economic and political considerations, which 
dominated policy and academic attention at the start of the crisis. Prior studies provide 
established measurements of economic and political variables (e.g. Karyotis and Rüdig, 
2015), while the health model relates more specifically to the particularities of the 
pandemic (e.g. Lancet, 2020) and the prevention paradox (Rose, 1985). The selection of 
what variables to include in each of our models is grounded in theory and grouped 
thematically. To ensure that these clusters actually exist in the minds of people and 
influence their thinking, we used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). This is a multivariate 
statistical procedure that is used to test how well the measured variables represent the 
number of constructs, predicting the patterns of correlations in our observations and 
question items. Results of the CFA (in the Appendix) indicate that each item included is a 
significant component of the model (stat. significant p < 0.001).  The Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is 0.087 and 0.071 for the Socio-Political (health, 
economic and political constructs) and Crisis Management Models (Severity and Nature, 
Blame Attribution, Remedies and Trade-Offs, Science and Scientific Expertise 
constructs), respectively. Values are below 0.1, which is the cut-off value for a reasonably 
good fit of the data to the specific, theory-derived measurement model. Thus, we are 
confident that each item included is a significant component of the model and that models 
are consistent with the theory.   
 
The Drivers of Support for Social Distancing  
Academic and policy attention has mainly pointed towards personal circumstances and 
socio-economic factors to predict support for social distancing, which our data allows us 
to test using a series of OLS models. Before turning our attention to crisis framing 
dynamics, in Table 1 we present a comprehensive socio-economic model, constituted by 
separate health, economic and political sub-models. The coefficients obtained in these 
are largely as expected from the literature. First, the prevention paradox is confirmed 
(Rose, 1985), with people already diagnosed with COVID-19 being statistically less likely 
to support the lockdown. Health vulnerability and concern about one’s self or a member 
of one’s family catching the virus increases support for measures, with health variables 
shown robustness to the addition of economic and political variables (as the final column 
in Table 1 shows). Second, the economic model confirms that people with caring 
responsibilities and those that feel economically more vulnerable than others are 
significantly less likely to support the measures. Concerns over paying bills and 
prospective evaluations about personal and national economic circumstances do not 
impact on attitudes. Third, people who consider that they can personally influence whether 
                                                 
5 The two statements used to measure attitudes to science have been fielded in the ISSP ‘Environment’ 
module of 1993, 2002, and 2010 (www.issp.org) and have informed a number of empirical studies (e.g. 
Reyes 2015; Rutjens et al 2018). 
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they get infected, are better informed about the pandemic crisis and trust the British 
government, are significantly more likely to support the measures – evaluations about its 
performance in managing the pandemic make no difference, at this early stage. 
Untypically, it is left, and not right-wing, ideology that increases public support for 
draconian measures in the face of a public health emergency, which requires sacrifices 
for the collective good. This, and questions about the perceived efficacy, not only of 
individuals, but also of specific policy measures (e.g. wearing masks) should be explored 
in future research.  
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Overall, the adjusted R2 in Table 1 indicates that 12% of the variation of the dependent 
variable is explained by health factors, 10% by economic and 18% by political 
considerations. Taken together, the socio-economic model explains only 22% of the 
variation in support for the lockdown, indicating that other factors also play an important 
role in shaping support for social distancing. Our theoretical expectation is that framing 
may account for some of the missing variance. Table 2 presents a Crisis Management 
composite model, consisted of four sub-models, each corresponding to the four framing 
contests discussed earlier.  
 
Starting with the Nature and Severity model, coefficients show that people who see the 
crisis as a threat that may overwhelm the NHS or increase unemployment, are significantly 
more likely to support the measures. On the other hand, those concerned about social 
unrest or Britain becoming a police state, are significantly more likely to oppose them. 
Interestingly, concern over the NHS is not a robust predictor of public attitudes, as the last 
column in Table 2 shows, which indicates that a central element in the government’s crisis 
communications failed to register with the public. The number of expected deaths, as a 
proxy for the crisis’ objective severity, has no impact on public attitudes on the lockdown, 
confirming our hypothesis. Overall, the adjusted R2 of the model indicates that it explains 
17% of the variance of our dependent variable.  
 
Personal responsibility allocated to people not following social distancing has the 
strongest positive effect in explaining support for social distancing measures in the Blame 
Attribution model, in line with the government’s key messaging. Individuals who assign 
high levels of blame to each member of society also show significantly more support for 
social distancing measures. As expected, those blaming the UK government are less likely 
to support social distancing, but this finding is not robust to the addition of other 
explanations and control variables at this early stage of the crisis. On the other hand, 
exogenising blame to the Chinese government or globalisation, does not impact on public 
attitudes, arguably because such frames were neither as salient nor as weaponised in UK 
political debates, as was, for instance, the case in the United States. Overall, these results 
suggest that levels of support are higher among individuals, who shifted the government’s 
responsibility to the individuals in society. The R2 indicates that the model explains 19% 
of the variation of the dependent variable.  
 
The third framing contest (the remedies and perceived trade-offs required to contain the 
pandemic) holds, by far, the strongest explanatory power, explaining 38% of the variance 
16 
 
in our dependent variable. Our regression analysis shows that the perceived necessity of 
measures plays the biggest role in driving support, while the fairness frame, invoked by 
the opposition party mainly, does not make any statistical difference. This replicates 
findings from the Eurozone crisis and is in line with securitisation theory (Karyotis and 
Rüdig, 2015). Those who see the crisis as an opportunity are significantly more likely to 
support social distancing measures, while the ‘fatalist’ frame decreases the level of 
support for social distancing. Both of the perceived trade-offs are statistically significant, 
confirming that people are less likely to support social distancing measures when they 
consider that the state of the economy or the protection of civil liberties should be 
prioritised over the health of the population. All these variables are robust to the addition 
of other explanations and control variables, as shown in the last column of Table 2.  
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
Lastly, the scientific model explains 18% of the variance of our dependent variable, more 
than both the health and economic models (see Table 1). Contrary to expectations, 
perceptions about the causes of the pandemic, scientific or conspiracy ones, have no 
impact on public support for social distancing, likely because they were largely absent in 
UK debates, unlike the USA. Our results also show that climate change sceptics, and 
those privileging faith over science, are significantly less likely to support government 
measures. However, once control variables and other framing contests are taken into 
account, the only variable from this model that remains robust in its effect is whether 
people trust the scientists advising the UK government: those who do so are significantly 
more likely to support the social distancing measures, as hypothesised.   
 
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the demographics of age, gender and ethnicity, produce 
consistent and statistically significant results that are in line with the expectations derived 
from the literature. Older people and females are more likely to support government 
measures (Lancet, 2020) but those from an ethnic minority background are less likely to 
do so (Van Scoy et al., 2020). Interestingly, key workers are less supportive of social 
distancing measures, but the effect loses its significance in some models, indicating that 
variation in support for the lockdown from key workers is contingent on other factors.  
 
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of the previously unexplored significance of 
framing contests around the nature, severity and appropriate response to a crisis in 
shaping public attitudes, and in this case, driving support for social distancing. The crisis 
management framing comprehensive model has an adjusted R2 twice the size of that of 
the socio-economic model (0.40 and 0.20, respectively), indicating that it offers a better 
fit. This is further corroborated by the Akaike Information Criterion and a series of 
goodness of fit tests (see Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix) which, in all cases, indicate 
that the crisis management model represents a significant improvement over the other 
models. Our results are not driven by any possible problem of multicollinearity between 
predictors, since the Variance Inflation Factor present in all cases, values closer to 1 
(absence of multicollinearity) and smaller than 5 (problematic levels of multicollinearity 






This article sought to explore the drivers of support for social distancing, using the UK as 
a case study. While our analysis confirms the influence of a range of health, socio-
economic and political factors, we show that framing dynamics around key framing 
contests drive public attitudes, more than anything else. This empirically demonstrates 
that socially constructed narratives impact policy outcomes and play a crucial, but under-
appreciated, role in the effectiveness of responses to Covid-19 (Mintrom and O’Connor, 
2020). In line with theoretical expectations, we find that perceptions about the nature and 
severity of the threat influence public attitudes more than objective considerations (Buzan 
et al, 1998). Interestingly, placing not only ‘public health’ but also ‘employment’ as the 
referent object that is to be protected, enhances support for measures in the UK. This 
implies that health and the economy are not inherently understood as a trade-off during 
the pandemic. It is only when they are presented as such in discourse that they drive 
attitudes in antithetical directions. Counter-securitisation frames about the lockdown 
posing a greater threat to the economy or civil liberties may, however, find fertile ground 
to develop during a protracted crisis, unless governments are able to construct convincing 
narratives about the nature/severity, responsibility for escalation, and appropriate 
response to the pandemic. 
 
Our analysis shows that the UK government’s initial fatalistic messaging (‘herd immunity’) 
had a detrimental and lasting effect on support for later-mandated measures. However, 
once it adopted securitising rhetoric, and with other actors rallying around the flag, its key 
diagnostic and, especially, its prognostic frames resonated with the public and drove 
support for social distancing. Its core message, about the necessity to ‘stay home’ to ‘save 
lives’, we find was particularly effective in mobilising public support, alongside its frame 
emphasising personal responsibility, as a positive incentive to support a common good. 
Its other key message, however, about the need to ‘protect the NHS’, as a secondary 
referent object, failed to impact on attitudes. This may plausibly be attributed to the inability 
of the government to ‘practice what it preached’, by ensuring at the very least that sufficient 
personal protective equipment (PPE) is available for NHS staff. As Mintrom and O’Connor 
(2020, 218) note, ‘No matter how compelling a narrative is and how engaging the delivery, 
if the policies that are implemented contradict that narrative, then trust and cooperation 
will wane’. Policy failures and contradictions may therefore undermine the ability of 
governments to maintain public support, especially as the crisis deepens. 
 
The British case is atypical in that demands for securitisation emerged from the bottom-
up, with the government delaying the adoption of extraordinary measures to contain the 
spread of COVID-19. In a globalised world, the public may exert upward pressure or be 
influenced by external debates, as, for example, indicated by the high percentage of Brits 
blaming the Chinese Government or agreeing with conspiracy theories that the virus 
escaped from a lab in Wuhan. However, neither of these, nor the frame promoted by 
political opponents that the measures were unfair, had any impact on driving public 
attitudes. The only prognostic frame that did not feature in political debates at the start of 
the crisis but which, we find, predicts support for social distancing is the ‘crisis as 
opportunity’ frame that shapes attitudes to social distancing. Such a message, if invoked 
by governments successfully as another form of positive incentivisation, may be a 
particularly effective framing strategy to enhance continuing support for measures during 
a prolonged crisis. These findings resonate with the literatures on crisis management and 
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securitisation theory that governmental elites are best positioned to shape security 
attitudes, at least at the start of a crisis (e.g. Buzan et al, 1998; Boin et al., 2016). 
 
Overall, our analysis strengthens the case for further research on how elite frames 
influence public attitudes during a crisis, to fully understand the dynamics of crisis 
communication and identify causal pathways, which likely requires panel data. Employing 
mixed-methods, as proposed in this article, provides us with the required tools to examine 
both the salience and resonance of framing contests, in a specific context. Finally, future 
research may fruitfully explore how attitudes to science influence political behaviour, not 
only because trusting the scientists advising the government is shown to have a significant 
effect in enhancing public support for social distancing but also because this area is 
perhaps emerging as a new cleavage in the Western world, which may be particularly 
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